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Abstract. Social information is immensely valuable. Yet we waste it. The information we get 17 
from observing other humans and from communicating with them is a cheap and reliable 18 
informational resource. It is considered the backbone of human cultural evolution. Theories and 19 
models focused on the evolution of social learning show the great adaptive benefits of evolving 20 
cognitive tools to process it. In spite of this, human adults in the experimental literature use 21 
social information quite inefficiently: they do not take it sufficiently into account. A 22 
comprehensive review of the literature on five experimental tasks documented 45 studies 23 
showing social information waste, and 4 studies showing social information being over-used. 24 
These studies cover “egocentric discounting” phenomena as studied by social psychology, but 25 
also include experimental social learning studies. Social information waste means that human 26 
adults fail to give social information its optimal weight. Both proximal explanations and 27 
accounts derived from evolutionary theory leave crucial aspects of the phenomenon unaccounted 28 
for: egocentric discounting is a pervasive effect that no single unifying explanation fully 29 
captures. Cultural evolutionary theory’s insistence on the power and benefits of social influence 30 
is to be balanced against this phenomenon.  31 
 32 
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1. Introduction  36 
 37 
The human capacity to use social information is fundamental to our species’ cultural evolution—38 
arguably humankind’s key adaptive asset [1–4]. It affords enormous cognitive benefits, allowing 39 
individuals to avoid the costs of individual exploration, and most importantly, to avail 40 
 2 
themselves of collective progresses no individual could have made on their own. One is naturally 41 
tempted to infer that humans evolved both uncommon capacities for using social information, 42 
and an uncommon degree of dependence on it. Leading specialists of cultural evolution embrace 43 
this view, drawing on alleged cases of over-reliance on the example of others, such as the 44 
imitation of kamikaze suicides [5] or celebrity suicides [4,6], and the copying of prestigious 45 
models in domains where these models are clearly incompetent [7]. However, several 46 
experimental results, including from the cultural evolution research tradition, suggest that 47 
individuals (this paper focuses on human adults) use social information sub-optimally. 48 
Specifically, they do not use it enough. 49 
 50 
Social information consists in all the things that an individual can learn from others, be it through 51 
intentional communication, demonstrations, or the mere observation of behaviours that are not 52 
necessarily meant to be seen [1,8]. We use social information whenever we let it affect our 53 
behaviour. Alongside social information, we routinely process large amounts of non-social 54 
information. Here we'll call it "individual": primary perceptions that come to us directly from the 55 
world, neither coming from nor mediated by other people. Individual information has one clear 56 
advantage over social information: it comes to us processed by no filter but our own sensory 57 
nervous system. Social information is processed or produced by others before we process it, 58 
which can cause distortions due to random error, bias, or deliberate deception.  59 
 60 
In a social world, individual information acquires two new uses.  61 
 62 
First, each agent’s individual information can be combined with others agents’ individual 63 
information, producing “wisdom of crowds” effects. When several agents produce two 64 
independent (i.e., not influenced by or copied from the other agent) guesses on a state of the 65 
world, and if (for binary decisions) each individual agent is more likely to be right than wrong, 66 
the combination of their guesses through majority voting or averaging usually gives a far more 67 
reliable guess than any single answer [9–11]. This well-known result only holds, however, to the 68 
extent that individual guesses are independent from each other: each guess must reflect 69 
individual information [12,13].  70 
 71 
Second, possessing a piece of information that is not (or not yet) social may give one an edge in 72 
strategic relations with conspecifics. Disclosed to others, it enhances one's reputation as a 73 
reliable informant and valuable cooperator [14]. Kept to oneself, it makes it possible to reap 74 
rewards that elude others [15]. Both types of information (the social and the asocial) thus have 75 
their advantages and drawbacks. How much weight should we give to individual or social 76 
information, and how much effort should we spend acquiring one or the other? 77 
 78 
Experimental evidence from several independent research traditions has evidenced a surprising 79 
discrepancy between efficiency rules for social information use, and human participants’ actual 80 
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behaviour. Contrary to what one might expect from a cultural species, participants appear to put 81 
too little weight on the information they can gather from other people’s decisions or testimony. 82 
In each of the literatures we survey, the relevant findings are relatively uncontroversial: we do 83 
not claim to be discovering anything that is not already known. However, researchers in one field 84 
do not necessarily know about all the findings from other fields. As a result, the pervasiveness of 85 
egocentric discounting is not always fully realised. Furthermore, no single field possesses an 86 
integrated account of why it occurs in its multiple manifestations. The present paper precisely 87 
aims at filling this lacuna, proceeding in three steps. Part 2 synthetises the available experimental 88 
evidence for the overweighting of individual information relative to social information, 89 
surveying social psychology, cultural evolution, and experimental economics. In Part 3, we 90 
discuss the putative proximate factors that have been put forward to explain this effect: cognitive 91 
biases, task-specific demands, biases in participants sampling. In Part 4, we discuss some 92 
ultimate factors that one can derive from theories or models about social learning’s evolutionary 93 
history. In conclusion (part 5), our survey reveals that no single explanation taken in isolation 94 
captures all the aspects of the phenomenon.  95 
 96 
2. How much does social information weigh in our decisions? 97 
 98 
The supplementary materials present a list of publications that specifically document how 99 
experimental participants (focusing exclusively on human adults) give less weight to social 100 
information when it conflicts with a belief that they hold based on previous knowledge, or with a 101 
piece of private information provided by the experimenters to them but not to others. A 102 
comprehensive list of inclusion criteria is given in Section 1 of the Supplementary Materials. 103 
These are studies in which participants are asked to perform a task, having access to both 104 
individual and social information. Pieces of information of both kinds are potentially relevant to 105 
the task, but often conflict. What counts as success in the task is clearly defined, and there are 106 
widely accepted normative frameworks that specify how agents should behave to succeed. 107 
Accurate performance, as opposed to agreement with other participants, is valued (usually 108 
incentivised). The participants are presented with social information, usually concerning the 109 
other participants’ responses, freely or at a small cost.  110 
 111 
The exact criteria for what constitutes rational or efficient use of social information vary 112 
depending on authors, protocols, or studies, but some basic criteria are shared by all. First, the 113 
opinion of two random participants should be given equal weights. Second, absent suspicions of 114 
deceptive intent or noisy transmission, other people’s opinion should not be given less weight 115 
merely because they come from others. These two principles imply that the average random 116 
participant should give equal weight to her opinion and to that of a random participant from the 117 
same group [16]. This basic principle can be formalised in various ways, the most common being 118 
Bayesian updating rules [17–22] or the averaging heuristic [16,23]. This point of view is not 119 
universally shared. Hawthorne-Madell and Goodman [24] defend a somewhat more relaxed view 120 
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of what counts as a rational use of social information. Their model does not place a priori 121 
restrictions on the degree of competence that an agent should attribute to a random unknown 122 
agent. If an agent believes themselves to be more knowledgeable and reliable than others, it is 123 
rational for them to discount others’ opinions. Indeed, under this assumption, the very fact that 124 
others disagree with the agent is evidence that their advice shouldn’t be trusted [24]. This model, 125 
however, does not explain why an agent would believe themselves to be better informed and 126 
more reliable than any random agent, on a topic that neither agent is especially competent about.  127 
 128 
We did a comprehensive search of the literature on five experimental tasks, detailed below. 129 
Overall, between 45 (counting only clear cases) and 49 (counting ambiguous cases, see Supp. 130 
Mat. Section 1 on what counts as a ambiguous case) of the studies we collected show that 131 
participants clearly fail to give enough weight to social information, showing excessive reliance 132 
on their own information, a phenomenon known as “egocentric discounting” in the advice-taking 133 
literature [25]. We re-use this label, here, to name a phenomenon that goes far beyond advice-134 
taking experiments. In contrast, we found only 3 publications (5 if we include two ambiguous 135 
cases) showing a bias in the other direction or an absence of bias. This review is no quantitative 136 
proof, but it is in line with the consensus view in the publications we surveyed (See 137 
supplementary materials, in particular section 1 on inclusion criteria). Evidence for egocentric 138 
discounting, which consists in giving individual information greater weight than would be 139 
normatively warranted, comes from at least three independent research traditions (social 140 
psychology, cultural evolution-inspired experiments, and behavioural economics). In all three, 141 
egocentric discounting came up as a surprise discovery—at least not one that previous theorising 142 
had predicted. These studies mainly use five broad types of tasks.  143 
 144 
The advice-taking paradigm. The standard form of this task is the “Judge-Advisor System” [26], 145 
but we also consider studies that do not use this exact paradigm, or do not explicitly do so, as 146 
well as studies from the forecast combination literature [27,28]. In a typical advice-taking task, 147 
the participant is asked to make a quantitative judgement on a factual question (e.g. “What is the 148 
height of Mount Everest?”). Having given this first answer, they are confronted with another 149 
participant’s answer, and allowed to give a second answer. Accurate answers are usually (but not 150 
always) incentivized (incentives tend to decrease the egocentric discounting effect without 151 
eliminating it) [29]. The main variants involve presenting the participant with the other estimate 152 
before asking them for their own, presenting the participant with an average of the group’s 153 
estimate, or allowing discussions between participants. The normative strategy in such tasks, for 154 
the second answer, is to average, i.e., to move halfway towards the other participant’s guess [28], 155 
unless one has reasons to think the advisor is clearly more (or less) knowledgeable than oneself. 156 
All the studies we gathered find evidence of egocentric discounting, at least in their baseline 157 
condition: the participants’ second guess modifies their first guess in the direction of the 158 
advisor’s guess, but gives much more weight to the participant’s first guess than to the advisor’s. 159 
Table 1 in the supplementary materials shows weight of advice (WOA) values (or similar 160 
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measures) for 40 experiments across 17 publications. All 40 studies document a WOA below 161 
0.5, consistent with egocentric discounting, in one condition at least (usually the baseline 162 
condition). Egocentric discounting can be modulated by changing the participants’ confidence in 163 
their own answer and their perception of the advisor’s expertise, but all this happens against a 164 
baseline of heavy discounting. 165 
 166 
Two-armed bandit problems with social learning. In a typical task, a participant must choose 167 
between two options, A and B, one of which yields greater rewards on average. The payoff 168 
function linking A or B to the attached rewards is noisy, so that the best response can only be 169 
detected after a certain amount of exploration. Participants are typically informed about their 170 
rewards on each trial, with a piece of individual (and usually, private) information, but they are 171 
also informed about other participants’ choices. This information may concern one participant, a 172 
few, or all previous participants, it may or may not include the feedback that these participants 173 
received, it may or may not be available for free. Given this variation, there is not one single 174 
optimal strategy for taking social information into account in all these tasks, and even inside a 175 
given task, what would constitute optimal use cannot always be straightforwardly determined. 176 
Nevertheless, six studies show clear cases of egocentric discounting (vs. only one showing clear 177 
evidence of the opposite effect). In [30]’s “Best Color” condition, the option that gave the best 178 
payoff for the majority of participants on the previous round is announced, yet the model that 179 
best fits the data does not include social information. In [31], participants in the “social learning” 180 
condition are not given any individual feedback on their own responses, but they are told what 181 
the majority of participants chose in another condition, where those participants were given 182 
feedback. This information is under-used, resulting in sub-optimal choices. (Specifically, 12 out 183 
of 40 participants, self-described non-conformists, ignore it altogether.) In [32] (experiment 2), 184 
participants sometimes or (for 20 participants out of 55) always refuse to view a piece of 185 
information about others’ choices that is made freely available and would have improved 186 
decisions if followed. In experiment 3 of the same study, a conformist strategy (imitating what 187 
the majority of participants did on the previous rounds) is consistently optimal but not 188 
consistently followed by participants, who tend to prefer relying on their own private 189 
information. Importantly, learning based on non-social information is, in these studies, highly 190 
effective (e.g. [31]). In other words, participants have no difficulty updating their behaviour 191 
when the feedback consists in individual (rather than social) information. This suggests that 192 
general difficulties with belief updating cannot explain social information under-use in these 193 
tasks. 194 
 195 
“Virtual arrowheads” experiments. These experiments, developed by Mesoudi and his group 196 
(e.g. [33,34]) can be seen as a many-dimensional version of a multi-armed bandit task. 197 
Participants devise, via a computer interface, arrowheads that are used for simulated “hunts”, and 198 
rewarded depending on their hunts’ success. Hunting success is a function of the arrowhead’s 199 
properties (a range of parameters that participants determine). Although [35] found that 200 
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participants readily consulted and used social information when given the opportunity to view 201 
the choices of other players for free, requiring participants to pay for this information clearly 202 
pushes them to rely on their own feedback instead. In subsequent studies where participants must 203 
choose between getting feedback on their own hunts and seeing other people’s choices of 204 
arrowhead parameters, they choose the former, even though choosing the latter is more 205 
beneficial [33,34,36].  206 
 207 
In the last two types of tasks, a participant must guess a given state of the world on the basis of 208 
cues provided by the experimenter, and may be given, in addition to these cues, information on 209 
other participants’ choices (one or more). This general description fits both the use of cue-based 210 
learning paradigms in the advice-taking and social learning literatures [37–40], and the “ball-211 
and-urn” task used by behavioural economists to simulate cascades (e.g. [17], and see sup. mat.). 212 
In addition to the cues, participants may be given feedback regarding the accuracy of their 213 
choices, but in “ball-and-urn” studies, no feedback is given until rewards are disclosed at the end 214 
of the task.  215 
 216 
Cue-based learning. These studies, inspired by advice-taking tasks, differ from advice-taking 217 
tasks in one essential respect. Instead of basing their guesses on general knowledge, the subjects 218 
have access to a series of experimentally controlled cues. The subject makes a first guess on the 219 
basis of these cues, then makes a second (possibly revised) guess after being exposed to social 220 
information (either an expert’s guess, or a peer’s guess, or a group’s average guess). Once again, 221 
participants fail to update their first guess as much as they should [37–39]. Here again we only 222 
looked for positive evidence for egocentric discounting, or for the opposite effect. We do not 223 
include studies whose design may have allowed them to capture egocentric discounting, but 224 
which do not mention it among their findings, possibly because they did not look for it. Possible 225 
examples include [40,41]. 226 
 227 
Ball-and-urn tasks. In a typical ball-and-urn task (see sup. mat. for more information),the 228 
experiment starts with the experimenter randomly picking one out of two urns. Each urn contains 229 
balls of different colours, one urn having more balls of colour A, the other urn more balls of 230 
colour B. Participants, playing one after the other, are each given a ball drawn (with 231 
replacement) from the chosen urn. They must guess which of the two urns is being used, 232 
knowing that one urn contains more balls of colour A, the other more balls of colour B. (The 233 
ratio of A/B balls in each urn is typically known to the participants.) In addition to seeing the 234 
colour of their own ball (individual information), each participant knows the guesses made by 235 
everyone else before them. The studies in this group are the least straightforward to interpret, 236 
because of issues surrounding the normative criteria that apply to the task. To determine the 237 
weight that a participant should give to the decisions of the preceding participants, assumptions 238 
need to be made regarding their rationality, the probability that they err randomly, and the weight 239 
that they themselves put on their predecessors’ decisions. Standard models, based on rational 240 
choice (in the specific sense of Bayesian updating) and game-theoretic equilibria [42,43], assume 241 
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that all agents update their beliefs in a fully normative way, and know that other agents also do. 242 
Yet experimental participants do not behave in the normative way, as these models make clearly 243 
false predictions [43,44]. Since standard models are normatively valid for an agent only if other 244 
agents behave as the model say they should, which they do not, using them as a normative 245 
benchmark is questionable. Several alternative ways to prove egocentric discounting coexist in 246 
the literature. One consists in showing that a simple “private information” model, where 247 
participants take no account whatsoever of social information and only rely on their individual 248 
information, outperforms more complex model like the Bayes-Nash model [45–47]. Another is 249 
to demonstrate that participants overweigh their private information both relative to the optimal 250 
Bayes-Nash model but also relative to more realistic models, like the Quantal Response 251 
Equilibrium model [48]. Perhaps the most concrete demonstration comes from showing how 252 
much of the possible payoff participants forego by relying on private information (an important 253 
amount, while almost no payoff is lost from following social information) [44,49]. Together, 254 
these different lines of circumstantial evidence converge to show that participants in these tasks 255 
generally underuse social information. 256 
 257 
 258 
3. Proximate explanations for egocentric discounting 259 
 260 
Many potential explanations have been put forward to explain egocentric discounting [3,29,50]. 261 
A generally endorsed explanation is that people put less trust in socially acquired information 262 
than in individual information [29,51]. This explanation is not trivial. It does exclude some 263 
possible causes, for instance a general inability to revise one’s opinions in the face of 264 
information of whatever nature. There is a general consensus that egocentric discounting is 265 
different from, and stronger than, a simple inability to update our beliefs [27,29]. Belief updating 266 
in human adults is not optimal, but consistent evidence for a clear bias in favour of one’s prior 267 
opinion is lacking [52]. In most of the “bandit” and “arrowhead” tasks, participants get private 268 
feedback on their actions, which they take into account in a near-optimal way, contrasting with 269 
their poor use of social information [31,53]. Likewise, participants in advice-taking tasks use 270 
new evidence efficiently when it is not social [16,22]. Self-confidence is a reliable predictor of 271 
egocentric discounting [29]: indeed, as Hawthorne-Madell & Goodman show, it is rational (in 272 
the authors’ specific sense) for a self-confident agent to discount divergent opinions. However, 273 
simply saying that people fail to place as much trust in other informants as they place in 274 
themselves eschews the main question. Why do we not trust others as much as we ought to? 275 
 276 
Lack of ecological validity. The value of social information may be higher in experiments than it 277 
is in real life. According to a common critique of the experimental psychology of decision-278 
making, subjects tackle laboratory tasks with a series of heuristics adapted to real-life 279 
circumstances that need not obtain in the lab, leading to a mere appearance of irrationality [54]. 280 
Is there evidence that people fail to profit from social information optimally outside the lab? 281 
 8 
Non-laboratory evidence that people fail to trust social information as much as would be useful 282 
for them includes studies of vaccine refusal, climate change skepticism, and resistance to mass 283 
persuasion attempts (synthesised in [55]). The experiments reviewed here represent a wide range 284 
of methodologies, some highly controlled, others much closer to everyday experience. Among 285 
the most ecologically relevant, the early experiments on forecast updating grew from ergonomic 286 
research [37,56,57] What these studies ask of their subjects is little different from what they 287 
would do in the ordinary course of their life: update an epidemiological forecast or a medical 288 
treatment forecast, based on another opinion. Experiments in the advice-taking literature also 289 
place subjects in a fairly ordinary situation, that of updating one's estimate for a date (e.g. a 290 
historical or news event), a quantity (e.g., a price), given someone else's estimate. It is not clear 291 
how these tasks depart from ordinary situations in such a systematic way as to explain pervasive 292 
egocentric discounting. 293 
 294 
Culture. One popular explanation among cultural evolutionists explains egocentric discounting 295 
as an effect of culturally inculcated individualistic values [1,36,58]. Individualistic cultural 296 
learning is thought to be a “Western” phenomenon, absent in some cultures at least: China, Japan 297 
or Korea [1,59], or small-scale societies relying on pastoralism (according to [58]). However, 298 
clear evidence for egocentric discounting has been found in both groups. Egocentric discounting 299 
was documented in Japanese [60,61] and Chinese participants [20,36,62], and in a group of 300 
executives from 24 different nationalities [28]. While some studies find stronger rates of 301 
egocentric discounting in East Asian participants as opposed to Western ones [61], others do not 302 
[20,60]. In [36], only one sample of East Asian participants shows higher reliance on social 303 
learning, but the other two do not. Pastoralists in [58] show less discounting of social 304 
information compared to horticulturalists or city-dwellers, but they still discount it, as do the 305 
Altiplano pastoralists studied in [30]. Overall, the literature shows some evidence for cultural 306 
modulations of egocentric discounting, but does not support seeing it as a Western peculiarity. 307 
Geographical differences may also be determined by external factors (rather than culturally 308 
transmitted ideologies). For instance, experiencing economic and psychosocial adversity seems 309 
to increase reliance on social information [63]. 310 
 311 
Access to reasons. One standard explanation in the advice-taking literature holds that participants 312 
trust their own views more because they have access to their reasons for those views [16,64]. 313 
There are, however, reasons to doubt that this is a necessary condition. Results show that 314 
egocentric discounting occurs even when participants are asked to revise an estimate without 315 
being given access to the cues that motivated the estimate [65] and that egocentric discounting is 316 
also observed when participants are presented with someone else’s opinion, falsely presented as 317 




Task engagement. In most of the studies we reviewed, participants may be more actively 321 
involved in processing or producing individual information, than in receiving advice. Active 322 
engagement in a task promotes learning in a way that passive observation does not, arousing the 323 
participants’ attention to a greater extent and allowing them to encode information in distinctive 324 
ways [67]. In “two-armed bandit” and “arrowheads” tasks, the level of engagement is often 325 
strikingly higher for individual information: the nature of the feedback that participants receive is 326 
a direct consequence of their intentional actions, whereas social information is produced by 327 
others. In some of these tasks, participants may decide whether or not they want to see others’ 328 
choices, but the extent of their active involvement with social information ends there. In most 329 
advice-taking tasks, the participants actively generate their personal estimate, and are then 330 
passively exposed to someone else’s. Could this explain egocentric discounting in such cases? 331 
Partly, but once again it fails to explain why egocentric discounting obtains when participants are 332 
presented with someone else’s opinion falsely presented as their own [27,66]. The best argument 333 
against an account of egocentric discounting based on the participants’ active involvement may 334 
come from ball-and-urn tasks, where both individual and social information consist in passively 335 
received cues. Social information remains discounted. It is worth noting, however, that in 336 
experiments where social information has to be actively requested, instead of being passively 337 
presented, subjects are prone to request too much social information [68,69], even when that 338 
information is worthless [70].  339 
 340 
An anchoring effect in advice-taking tasks. These tasks typically ask a participant to formulate 341 
their own guess for a quantitative or numerical question, then to update it after being exposed to 342 
someone else’s guess. These are favourable conditions for an anchoring effect to occur. 343 
Anchoring effects happen when a piece of information biases an estimate because all subsequent 344 
estimates are referred to it and weighed in its direction, to a greater extent than they should be, 345 
and even when the piece of information is completely irrelevant — for instance, a random 346 
number [71]. In one sense, egocentric discounting truly is a type of anchoring effect: the 347 
participants’ initial estimate is given excessive weight, preventing them from updating their 348 
guess as much as they should. However, there are good reasons to reject the view that the general 349 
mechanisms at work in the anchoring effect explain egocentric discounting [27,29,65,72]. One 350 
reason is that an egocentric effect still obtains when participants complete a number of unrelated 351 
numerical estimation tasks between their first estimate and their last estimate, which should 352 
cancel any priming effect [27]. Furthermore, telling participants that an estimate is their own is 353 
sufficient to trigger egocentric discounting in favour of that estimate, even when the estimate is 354 
not actually their own, and is presented for the first time [27,66]. If egocentric discounting rested 355 
on a mere anchoring effect, labelling estimates as one’s own or others should not matter. See 356 




Low exploration rates in “bandit” and “arrowhead” tasks. In these two types of tasks, 360 
participants must update their behaviour in response to feedback, in a simulated environment 361 
where the payoff associated with each response is noisy, and may change over time. In some of 362 
these experiments, environmental changes are faster than in habitual real-life situations. A failure 363 
to adjust to the rapid rates of these changes could lead to conservatism, i.e., a tendency to stick to 364 
the solution one chose on previous trials (or remain close to it) instead of changing to the 365 
(correct) solution available with social learning. Two studies show a correlation between 366 
exploratory behaviour and social learning. In the "social and individual learning condition" of 367 
[34] (Experiment 2), changes in the up-coming responses were greater for participants who opted 368 
to copy a model than for those who did not. In [74] participants in the "social learning" 369 
condition, who could see the solutions that other participants gave to the task, were more 370 
explorative than participants in the individual learning condition, who could not. The data in [34] 371 
in particular raise the possibility that participants neglected social information because of a 372 
general aversion to exploration (in [74], it is not clear whether participants under-use social 373 
information). However, neither study establishes causation. In [74], the availability of social 374 
information is experimentally manipulated and controlled, so high exploration must be a 375 
consequence of social learning—not its cause. Another study that experimentally manipulates the 376 
availability of social information, and finds that social information induces a greater level of 377 
exploration, is [50]. Here again, greater explorativeness cannot cause social learning. Both 378 
studies suggest that relations between exploration and social learning, when present, are likely to 379 
reflect an effect of social information upon exploratory behaviours, rather than the opposite. (See 380 
[75] for additional evidence against a causal link between exploratory behaviour and social 381 
information use). 382 
 383 
 384 
4. Evolutionary explanations for egocentric discounting 385 
 386 
The mechanisms discussed in the previous sections have to do with the specifics of experimental 387 
situations, from participant selection to task demands. We now move on to possible explanations 388 
for egocentric discounting that see it as a functional and adaptive feature of the way we deal with 389 
social information. 390 
 391 
Epistemic vigilance. Trouche et al. [66] interpret egocentric discounting through the lens of 392 
Sperber et al.’s epistemic vigilance framework [76]. In this view, human adults have an a priori 393 
reluctance to believe communicated information, unless accompanied by arguments or other 394 
guarantees of reliability. This default vigilance serves as a protection against attempted 395 
manipulation [76]. A straightforward implication seems to be that social information will be less 396 
readily accepted when a source intentionally communicates it, rather than letting it leak 397 
inadvertently. Yet, it is unclear whether participants in the experiments we just reviewed usually 398 
perceive social information as being intentionally communicated to them by the source. With a 399 
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few exceptions [77], social information is merely introduced as another participant’s opinion, 400 
leaving it unspecified whether the participant intended their opinion to be shown, or even knew 401 
that it would be. The same is true of most two-armed bandit tasks, arrowhead experiments, and 402 
cue-based learning tasks: social information is eavesdropped by its recipient, not openly 403 
communicated by its source. The major exception are “ball-and-urn” experiments, where 404 
participants know that their answers will be made public to all subsequent participants [17,44]. 405 
Contrary to what epistemic vigilance might imply, this seems to cause participants to trust social 406 
information more, not less. Participants in ball-and-urn tasks tend to answer in ways that are 407 
helpful for others (but possibly harmful for themselves). Working with a task similar in its main 408 
features to the ball-and-urn tasks, [78] argue that participants are aware of this, and show that 409 
participants are more likely to follow their predecessor’s advice than to imitate their action—the 410 
opposite of what epistemic vigilance would suggest. This piece of counter-evidence is merely 411 
suggestive: testing the epistemic vigilance hypothesis would require experiments that make it 412 
clear to participants whether other participants intentionally produced social information for 413 
other participants to use. 414 
 415 
A producer-scrounger dilemma for information use. Social information is only useful when 416 
others also gather information asocially. Cultural-evolutionary models contain a possible 417 
explanation of egocentric discounting. Rogers’ influential model [79] showed that social learning 418 
may not provide any advantage over individual learning when the environment changes. The 419 
advantage of using social learning depends on the frequency of social learners in the population: 420 
if those are too numerous, social learning is useless. When there are mostly individual learners, 421 
copying is effective, because it saves the costs of individual exploration, and because the 422 
probability of copying a correct behaviour is high. However, when there are mostly social 423 
learners, the risk of copying an outdated behaviour increases and individual learners are 424 
advantaged. This means the advantages of social-learning are inversely frequency-dependent: the 425 
more other people learn socially, the less efficient it is to learn from them. The same logic is 426 
reflected, on a smaller scale, in models of information cascades, where social learning can (with 427 
a small probability) become detrimental for an individual when too many other individuals resort 428 
to it. More generally, a broad range of models converge upon the view that social information 429 
use can be likened, in terms of evolutionary game theory, to a producer-scrounger dynamic 430 
[35,75,80]. At equilibrium, these games typically yield a mixed population of producers 431 
(individual learners) and scroungers (social learners), where neither type does better than the 432 
other [81,82]. Egocentric discounting might emerge from a producer-scrounger dilemma, as a 433 
response to the devaluation of social information which may occur when too many other agents 434 
rely on social learning. 435 
 436 
This hypothesis potentially explains several phenomena related to egocentric discounting. A 437 
frequency-dependent equilibrium could account for egocentric discounting in a subset of 438 
experimental participants [83]. These participants could be wasting social information for two 439 
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reasons, a strategic one and an altruistic one. The strategic reason starts from the premise that 440 
other participants rely excessively on social learning, making it hazardous to follow them. On a 441 
more altruistic account, egocentric discounting may be a way to help the community of 442 
participants with first-hand information [50]. Egocentric discounting, in this perspective, is 443 
altruistic: it increases the amount of information circulating in a group, at the cost of making the 444 
discounter less accurate [42]. Only two studies, to our knowledge, address the possible effect of 445 
altruistic motivations on egocentric discounting. In Eriksson & Strimling [50], subjects who 446 
scored high on a prosocial attitudes survey (Social Value Orientation scale) showed a greater 447 
propensity to acquire individual as distinct from social information, although [69] fails to find an 448 
impact of self-reported altruistic tendencies on subjects’ preferences for social or private 449 
information. A "producer-scrounger equilibrium" account may also explain the widely 450 
documented inter-individual heterogeneity in propensities for social learning [53,75,84,85] since 451 
such an equilibrium is based upon the coexistence of two opposite strategies. However, this 452 
account leaves several questions unanswered, which future work might address.  453 
 454 
- How do we explain egocentric discounting at the aggregate level? The experiments we review 455 
document egocentric discounting effects at the level of entire groups of subjects. Even though 456 
inter-individual variation, when explored, can be large, the discarding of social information is not 457 
driven by a minority, and it is not compensated, overall, by an equally strong tendency in the 458 
opposite direction. Why are there so few information scroungers? 459 
 460 
- Do egocentric discounters expect others to over-rely on social information, and why? The 461 
producer-scrounger dilemma account appears to assume that people waste social information 462 
because they assume (consciously or not) that others are too reliant on it, making it less useful. 463 
But in most of the studies we reviewed the opposite holds true: most participants rely too little on 464 
social information, not too much.  465 
 466 
 467 
5. Conclusion 468 
 469 
There is little doubt that our species relies a great deal on social information, and that cultural 470 
transmission would be impossible if we did not use it [7,76,86]. This makes the well-known 471 
phenomenon of egocentric discounting all the more puzzling. This paper documented it across 472 
five different experimental paradigms (going beyond standard cases of egocentric discounting in 473 
the advice-taking literature). Several independent research traditions uncovered different aspects 474 
of the same phenomenon, a phenomenon that none of them had predicted. Combining the results 475 
of a diverse range of tasks allows for a better assessment of the most common explanations. Our 476 
review highlights the difficulty of explaining away egocentric discounting with any single-cause 477 
account, and stresses the need to study egocentric discounting through the lenses of the multiple 478 
research traditions that have investigated it. Those complement each other. Social psychology is 479 
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strong on ecological validity. Cultural evolution research seeks diverse subject pools of 480 
participants. Experimental economics is weaker on both these counts, but cascade experiments 481 
provides evidence against mechanisms that play a role in other paradigms: for instance, task 482 
engagement or epistemic vigilance.    483 
 484 
A closer look at egocentric discounting also addresses a long-running debate in cultural 485 
evolutionary theory. A long-standing critical argument rightly stresses the artificial nature of the 486 
distinction between social and individual learning [87,88]. Social learning, as the critics point 487 
out, need not be anything but individual learning from social cues: humans require no special-488 
purpose adaptation, no dedicated cognitive module to learn from others. We fully agree with this 489 
stance, with one subtle difference. Individual and social information may be processed by the 490 
same mechanisms, but not on an equal footing. The information that one gets on one’s own 491 
engages our attention differently; it is more tractable and traceable than information that comes 492 
to us filtered through others’ minds. Because it is acquired independently, it is also of more use 493 
to others than second-hand information. 494 
 495 
Cultural evolution, alongside social psychology and experimental economics, has done much to 496 
document and explore the fact that socially acquired information may be given less weight than 497 
equivalent individual information. No extant theory predicts this phenomenon in all its 498 
dimensions or in a straightforward way. An exciting next step could consist in drawing the 499 
cultural consequences of our reluctance to incorporate information: how it impacted the 500 
evolution of social learning in our evolutionary past, and the diffusion of culture throughout our 501 
history.  502 
 503 
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